Rusijos švelnioji galia kaip riboto poveikio priemonė Lietuvoje by Česnakas, Giedrius & Isoda, Vytautas
60
Politologija ISSN 1392-1681   eISSN 2424-6034 
2019/1, vol. 93, pp. 60–97 DOI: https://doi.org/10.15388/Polit.2019.93.3
Russia’s Soft Power as a Limited 
Efficiency Tool in Lithuania
Giedrius Česnakas
Associate Professor at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania 
email: giedrius.cesnakas@lka.lt
Vytautas Isoda
Associate Professor at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania 
email: vytautas.isoda@lka.lt
Summary. Lithuania has been a target of Russia’s soft power efforts for the past two de-
cades. The aim of this article is to analyse Russia’s soft power influence possibilities in 
Lithuania. First, it analyzes how soft power is interpreted in Russia compared to the West-
ern conception. Then, Russia’s soft power instruments and their core goals are reviewed, 
not all of which fall under the category of “soft power instruments” according to the West-
ern understanding. The article proceeds with demographic changes in Lithuania and trends 
of consumption of Russian culture and information in Lithuania. The main argument is that 
Russia is not aiming to apply soft power to the general Lithuanian society but to particular 
groups within the population (Russophone minorities and residents with sentiments for the 
Soviet Union). It can be assumed that demographic trends and Russia’s aggressive actions 
will increasingly limit its soft power capabilities. However, the greatest setback to Russia’s 
soft power in Lithuania is arguably caused by its continuing reliance on hard power when 
it comes to countries of the post-Soviet space.
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Rusijos švelnioji galia kaip riboto poveikio priemonė Lietuvoje
Santrauka. Pastaruosius du dešimtmečius – ypač po 2014 m. Rusijos agresijos prieš 
Ukrainą – Lietuvos užsienio ir saugumo politikos bendruomenė vis daugiau dėmesio skiria 
Rusijos švelniosios galios priemonių taikymui Lietuvoje. Vis dėlto Rusijos taikomos prie-
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monės ir jas apibūdinančios sampratos („informacinis karas“, „hibridinės grėsmės“ ir t. t.) 
neatitinka sąvokos „švelnioji galia“ autoriaus Josepho S. Nye siūlomo klasikinio apibrė-
žimo. Švelniosios galios samprata vis labiau „iškraipoma“. Atsižvelgiant į šį konceptualų 
disonansą, straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kokias švelniosios galios priemones ir kaip sėkmingai 
Rusija taiko Lietuvoje.
Straipsnio tikslas – išnagrinėti Rusijos švelniosios galios įtaką Lietuvoje analizuojant 
tokios galios priemonių arsenalą, jų taikymo tikslus, demografines bei Rusijos kultūros ir 
informacijos vartojimo tendencijas Lietuvoje. 
Šio straipsnio metodologija pagrįsta Rusijos mokslininkų, kurie pasiūlė taikyti švel-
niąją galią buvusioje sovietinėje erdvėje (įskaitant Lietuvą), įvardijamų priemonių analize. 
Analizė apsiriboja tik tomis švelniosios galios priemonėmis, kurios kardinaliai nepriešta-
rauja Josepho S. Nye požiūriui. Šių priemonių veiksmingumas vertinamas remiantis pirmi-
niais demografiniais ir gyventojų apklausų duomenimis.
Konstatuojama, kad Rusija siekia taikyti švelniosios galios, taip kaip ji suprantama 
Joseph S. Nye, ne visos Lietuvos visuomenės, o tik tam tikrų grupių (rusakalbių mažumos 
ir gyventojų, teigiamai vertinančių sovietinę Lietuvos praeitį) atžvilgiu. Daroma prielaida, 
kad demografinės tendencijos ir agresyvūs Rusijos veiksmai vis labiau ribos jos švelnio-
sios galios sklaidą, nepaisant apklausose pastebimo Lietuvos gyventojų noro palaikyti ge-
resnius santykius su kaimyne.
Išvadose teigiama, jog Rusija švelniąją galią dažnai supranta kaip „vienpusį eismą; ji 
nebando suvokti kitų valstybių patirties ir vertybių, atpažinti abipusių panašumų, o veikiau 
„primeta“ savo naratyvą; tokia strategija gali tikti tuo atveju, kai nacionalinės istorijos ver-
sijos pakankamai sutampa (pavyzdžiui, Baltarusijos atveju), tačiau Lietuvos atveju ta stra-
tegija netinka. Svarbiausią vietą Rusijos naratyve užima „penkiolikos broliškų respublikų“ 
ir „pergalės Didžiajame Tėvynės kare“ elementai, kurie iš principo prieštarauja Lietuvoje 
įsitvirtinusiam „dviejų okupacijų“ ir „Sovietinės imperijos kalėjimo“ naratyvui ir kėsinasi 
paneigti lietuviškąją tapatybę.
Lietuvos visuomenės demografinės charakteristikos santykinai palankios Rusijos švel-
niosios galios veikimui, ypač dėl gausios rusakalbių mažumos ir rudimentinio rusų kalbos 
mokėjimo Lietuvos visuomenėje. Vis dėlto šios sąlygos nyksta dėl emigracijos (stip riausiai 
veikiančios būtent etninių mažumų bendruomenes Lietuvoje) ir natūralios kartų kaitos, tad 
ateityje Rusijos švelniosios galios įtaka potencialiai mažės.
Raktažodžiai: švelnioji galia, Rusija, Lietuva, kultūra, demografija.
Introduction
Since Russia’s invasion in Ukraine in 2014, Lithuania’s focus has 
been shifting toward Russia’s soft power instruments and discussions 
of their impact. The perception of Russia’s soft power as a core part 
of hybrid warfare (in the broadest and ill-defined sense), including 
informational and cyber warfare, brought forward by the Chief of the 
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General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, is growing.1 Having 
in mind the classical definition of soft power by Joseph S. Nye Jr., 
it is disturbing that Russia is able to reshape the core definition of 
soft power, which gradually becomes acceptable to policymakers and 
even experts. The transformed meaning of soft power might further 
lead to an increasing distortion of soft power instruments and prac-
tices, thus eroding the essence of soft power, replacing it with actions 
that contradict the phenomenon at its core. Despite these changes, 
it is worth analyzing how traditional instruments of soft power are 
being applied by Russia in Lithuania and how efficient they are in 
swaying the Lithuanian society in favor of Russia’s positions. 
Russia’s soft power capabilities toward Lithuania are significantly 
determined by the experience of bilateral relations, Russia’s domestic 
policies, and foreign policy activities. Lithuanian-Russian relations 
have been tense for the most of their duration since 1990, except 
for the 1990–1991 period, which can be considered an anomaly.2 
Somewhat positive relations were the outcome of the Russian gov-
ernment’s (under Boris Yeltsin) struggle with the government of the 
Soviet Union.3 When the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia inherit-
ed its power (or what was left of it) and responsibilities, the tensions 
started to increase, though until the mid-1990s, Lithuania and Rus-
sia signed core bilateral agreements. The geopolitical orientation of 
Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors (Estonia and Latvia) to NATO and 
1 Герасимов В., “Ценность науки в предвидении: новые вызовы переосмыслить 
формы и способы ведения боевых действий” [The Value of Science in Fore-
sight: New Challenges to Rethinking Forms and Methods of Warfare], Военно-
промышленный куръер [Military Industrial Courier], 2013, <https://www.vpk-news.
ru/articles/14632>, 2019 03 30.
2 This argument might seem odd, however; the blockade of the 1990s and the atrocities 
committed in 1991 have been performed by the Soviet Union, while the Russian So-
viet Federative Socialist Republic, headed by Boris Yeltsin, was in conflict with the 
leadership of the Soviet Union.
3 Vitkus G., Diplomatinė aporija: tarptautinė Lietuvos ir Rusijos santykių normalizaci-
jos perspektyva [Diplomatic Aporia: An International Perspective on the Normaliza-
tion of Lithuanian and Russian Relations], Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 
2006, p. 26–29.
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the European Union contradicted Russia’s interests. Russia sought 
to remain the regional hegemon in the ex-Soviet space.4 After Lith-
uania became a NATO and EU member, the period of a pro-Western 
“reach” and an ex-Soviet “drag” was officially over. Tensions in the 
relations of the two countries increased due to Russia’s aggressive 
energy statecraft and peaked in 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia, 
as Lithuania supported ex-Soviet states in their pro-Western orienta-
tions. Lithuania was caught up in the US president Barack Obama’s 
reset policy toward Russia, and the recently sworn in president Dalia 
Grybauskaite sought to rejuvenate relations with Moscow, but expec-
tations to build bridges were futile. When Lithuania started to prepare 
for the EU Presidency in 2013, bilateral relations became hostile on 
Russia’s side. Lithuania experienced informational attacks, a ban on 
dairy products, and limitations for carriers to work in Russia.5 The 
lowest point in bilateral relations was reached when Russia invad-
ed Ukraine in 2014, annexed Crimea, and fuelled a conflict in the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Since then, political relations are stag-
nating, the countries are talking about each other and not to each oth-
er. Tensions of nearly 30 years have a negative effect on Russia’s soft 
power in Lithuania. The original definition of “soft power” is being 
replaced by a power bearing disruptive rather than engaging nature.
4 Tsygankov A., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, 
4th ed. Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, p. 116–8; Donaldson R., Nogee J., Foreign 
Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, 4th ed. M. E. Sharpe Inc., 
2009, p. 163.
5 Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentė, „Geros kaimynystės santykių svarbą šalies vadovė 
telefonu aptarė su Rusijos prezidentu“ [The Head of State Discussed the Importance 
of Good Neighborly Relations with the Russian President by Phone], <https://www.
lrp.lt/lt/geros-kaimynystes-santykiu-svarba-salies-vadove-telefonu-aptare-su-rusijos-
prezidentu/6717>, 2018 08 10.
 Samoškaitė E., „Politikai: kibernetinės atakos prieš DELFI – atakos prieš valstybę“ 
[Politicians: Cyber Attacks against Delfi are Attacks against the State], LRT, <https://
www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/18644/politikai-kibernetines-atakos-pries-delfi-ata-
kos-pries-valstybe>, 2018 06 20.
 Alfa, „Rusija pranešė stabdanti lietuviškos pieno produkcijos įvežimą“ [Russia An-
nounce Halting the Import of Lithuanian Dairy Products], <https://www.alfa.lt/
straipsnis/15157466/Rusija.pranese.stabdanti.lietuviskos.pieno.produkcijos.ivezi-
ma=2013-10-07_09-27>, 2018 08 14.
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The aim of this article is to analyze Russia’s soft power influence 
possibilities in Lithuania through an analysis of choices of soft power 
instruments, their core goals, demographic changes in Lithuania, and 
the trends of the consumption of Russian culture and information 
in Lithuania. The article begins with an analysis of how soft pow-
er is understood in Russia; even though the term “soft power” was 
borrowed from the West, among all Russian scholars, Olga Leonova 
has put forth the most elaborate interpretation of this concept and 
therefore she is referenced at length in the first section. Later – stick-
ing to Nye’s original concept of soft power – the article argues that 
Russia is not aiming to apply soft power to the general Lithuanian 
society but to particular groups (Russophone minorities and residents 
with sentiments for the Soviet Union). It can be assumed that demo-
graphic trends and Russia’s aggressive actions will increasingly limit 
its soft power capabilities, despite the willingness of the Lithuanian 
society to maintain better relations. 
The methodology of this article is based on an analysis of soft 
power instruments identified by Russian scholars, who suggested to 
apply these instruments in the ex-Soviet space (including Lithuania); 
only those instruments that could be conceptually justified from the 
position of Nye’s approach are included in the analysis, while aggres-
sive and disruptive elements, despite the growing focus on them in 
the Western political and analytical communities, are dismissed. The 
focus is given to an analysis of how Russia applies soft power instru-
ments, their main target groups, and goals. The effectiveness of these 
instruments is not evaluated in any exact measures but rather inferred 
from various surveys conducted in Lithuania. The causes behind the 
current workings (or failures) of Russia’s soft power and its prospects 
in Lithuania are derived from comparing the official historical narra-
tives of the two countries and analyzing the sociodemographic data; 
so, in methodological terms, descriptive statistics are complemented 
by interpretation. 
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1. The Multiple Interpretations of Soft Power in Russia
The concept of soft power was originally coined by American po-
litical scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr.; he started using this term back in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s in order to raise the awareness of 
the full spectrum of power in world politics among US policymak-
ers who were mesmerized by their country’s unipolar moment.6 Nye 
suggested that coercion or inducement based on America’s immense 
material resources (i.e., hard power) are not the only way to achieve 
its foreign policy goals: “a country may obtain the outcomes it wants 
in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emu-
lating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – 
want to follow it.”7 Although the relationship between a country’s 
behavioral pattern – obtaining the outcomes a country wants – and 
the resources it possesses is never perfect, Nye believes that any state 
can accumulate soft power from three primary sources: its culture (if 
it is attractive to others), its political values (when the country lives 
up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they 
are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).8 It means that a 
country attempting to wield soft power is very much constrained in 
its words and actions (so as to maintain its reputation) compared to 
a country relying solely on hard power; at the same time, countries 
influenced by soft power have much more autonomy of action com-
pared to those subjugated by hard power, as they are free to choose 
whose example to follow in international politics.
Any power, however, is contextual, and the resources that produce 
certain outcomes in one type of situations are completely useless in 
6 See: Owens W. A., Nye J. S., “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
75, No. 2, 1996, p. 20–36;  Nye J. S., “Limits of American Power,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 4, 2002, p. 545–559; Nye J. S., Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
7 Nye J. S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Af-
fairs, 2004, p. 5.
8 Nye J. S., The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs, 2011, p. 84.
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achieving other goals in other types of settings. According to Nye, 
“soft power is particularly relevant to the realization of [so-called] 
‘milieu goals’ <…> [like] promoting democracy, human rights, and 
open markets; it is easier to attract people to democracy than to co-
erce them to be democratic.”9 Such goals are best defined as long-
term interests, first and foremost of the United States, and do not 
necessarily guarantee the realization of any short-term goals. Nye 
has been criticized extensively for treating the “Washington consen-
sus” (democracy and market economy) as “naturally” attractive to 
others,10 which implies that no active promotion of such values is 
actually needed. Nye ceded that
in the short term, attraction to the prevalent ideas in any given era can 
be treated as a given, but these ideas are not necessarily universal or im-
mutable. ‘Democracy’ is a prevalent idea in the current era, but it was not 
in some past eras. Nor is it the goal of the current violent jihadi terrorists 
who are struggling to construct alternative ideas that can become a ‘nat-
ural’ part of Islamic identity. The outcomes of such struggles are partly 
[determined] through narratives of reasoned persuasion.11 
That is why public diplomacy and sustained information cam-
paigns are seen in Western literature as the key to soft power;12 such 
policies can help upgrade the “raw” sources of soft power, such as 
popular culture and values, to actual attraction and alignment on the 
official political level.
9 Nye J. S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Af-
fairs, 2004, p. 17.
10 For example, see: Bially Mattern J., “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representatio-
nal Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Mil-
lennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, p. 591–596.
11 Nye J. S., “Notes for a Soft-Power Research Agenda” in Williams M., Berenskoetter F. 
(eds.), Power in World Politics, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 163.
12 Van Ham P., “Power, Public Diplomacy, and the Pax Americana” in Melissen J. (ed.), 
The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Basingstoke: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2005, p. 47–66; Nye J. S., The Future of Power, New York: Public 
Affairs, 2011, p. 100–109.
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The contextuality of soft power also implies that even though a 
given country has to sell its own culture, values, and policies to for-
eign audiences to be attractive, each and every audience “buys into” 
them to a different degree and in a very different fashion depending 
on its own culture and values. That is why, according to J. Nye, an 
“effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening 
as well as talking; soft power rests [primarily] on shared values.”13 
Most Western analysts of soft power emphasize the importance of a 
locally acceptable “frame” when transmitting one’s message interna-
tionally,14 which in turn implies a willingness to familiarize oneself 
with the target audience, to recognize its identity and moral agency.
The Russian approach to soft power is somewhat different from 
the Western approach in at least a few respects. Whereas in the West, 
a “softer” way to influence others and get the (mutually) desired out-
comes by co-option is seen as a “moral good,”15 Russia sees it as yet 
another field of a great power rivalry and – as it was pioneered by 
Americans – just another way to undermine Russia’s interests. In a 
way it is ethically even more sinister, as it is seen as a “concealed” 
form of aggression and domination. One of the first times when Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin discussed the issue of soft power at 
some length was in his 2012 article in the “Moscow News”; there he 
defined soft power as “a complex of tools and methods for achieving 
foreign policy goals without the use of weapons, but by means of in-
formation and other levers of influence <…> [which] are often used 
to foster and provoke extremism, separatism, nationalism, manipula-
tion of public consciousness, and direct intervention in the internal 
13 Nye J. S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Af-
fairs, 2004, p. 11.
14 Sikkink K., “Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Po-
wer” in Khagram S., James Riker J., Sikkink K. (eds.), Restructuring World Politics: 
Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002, p. 306–312.
15 Bially Mattern J., “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the 
Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics”, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, p. 590.
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politics of sovereign states.”16 Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
officially adopted this approach in its 2013 Foreign Policy Concept, 
which reads as follows: 
Soft power [is] a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy ob-
jectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and oth-
er methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy. <…> 
Increasing global competition <…> creates a risk of destructive and un-
lawful use of ‘soft power’ <…> to exert political pressure on sovereign 
states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situa-
tion, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing 
cultural and human rights projects.17 
Thus, soft power is not only seen as a “Western evil” but also as 
an area of zero-sum competition with the West, which Nye18 himself 
considers to be a major misinterpretation of his original idea.
Similar (or in some cases even more radical) conceptions of soft 
power to those adopted by the Kremlin are also expressed by Russian 
political scientists and commentators. For example, Pavel Parshin 
concludes that in the Russian political discourse, “soft power” is ei-
ther dismissed as not deserving to be called “power” at all or is seen 
in terms of conspiracy, manipulation, zombification, is demonized 
and mystified as an instrument of “colored” revolutions.19 Kira 
Latukhina and Maxim Glikin argue that soft power, which they dub 
“silent power,” is “the ability to influence the development of a polit-
ical situation abroad with the help of specially deployed experts and 
16 Путин В., “Россия и меняющийся мир” [Russia in the Changing World], <http://
www.mn.ru/politics/78738>, 2018 05 22.
17 The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by President 
of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on February 12, 2013.
18 Nye J. S., “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 
April 29, 2013. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/what-china-and-
russia-dont-get-about-soft-power. Accessed on June 3, 2018.
19 Паршин П., “Проблематика «мягкой силы» во внешней политике России” [The 
Problem of “Soft Power” in the Foreign Policy of Russia], Аналитические Доклады, 
выпуск 1 (36), 2013, p. 31–33.
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polit-technologists – a sort of agents of influence.”20 In other words, 
the Russian commentators value soft power only if and as much as it 
can guarantee direct control over the course of events in other coun-
tries; for Western scholars, as it was mentioned above, the strength 
of soft power lies primarily in creating a favorable social milieu that 
may help to achieve political goals at a later point but by no means 
guarantees success in world politics.
Olga Leonova of Moscow State University proposes a bit more 
nuanced approach to soft power compared to that of most Russian 
politicians and commentators, which bears at least some resemblance 
to Nye’s original  idea. Leonova defines soft power as a 
[f]oreign policy resource and specific instrument of the latent management 
of international processes, which become relevant precisely in the period 
of globalization. <…> Objects of latent management [control] are interna-
tional processes and relations, as well as individual countries and regions 
of the world. <…> Firstly, the influence of the subject in control works 
through the [inner] motivation of actions of the object of control. Second-
ly, there are no formal institutions, methods, and leverages of control.21
Even though Leonova’s definition is somewhat similar to Nye’s, 
eventually it is incorporated into the traditional framework of realpo-
litik still dominating the Russian thinking and deviates significantly 
from Nye’s idealistic approach to world politics. Leonova argues that 
“[a]s a result of the efficient application of soft power instruments, an 
illusion of mutual interests, trust, respect, and mutual understanding 
appears, and this creates possibilities for a given country to influence 
political and humanitarian processes in the world and in a particular 
state [which succumbs to this illusion].”22 Western idealists, for their 
20 Латухина К., Гликин М., “Политические животные” [The Political Animals], Lad-
no.ru, <https://ladno.ru/opinion/1428.html>, 2018 05 23.
21 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики государства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 28.
22 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики государства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 30.
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part, believe in an actual compatibility of interests between states 
(rather than illusion), which can be revealed by sharing information, 
and the purpose of public diplomacy is exactly that.
On the other hand, even the idealists of the West understand that 
the national interests of individual countries coincide only to a de-
gree, and putting soft power at work usually cannot affect the vital in-
terests of any given country; according to Nye, “[e]ven though North 
Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il watches Hollywood movies, that had 
little effect on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.”23 A sim-
ilar example is the United States’ image in the Middle East, where 
Washington has diverted an extensive part of it soft power efforts; 
however, the societies of the Middle Eastern countries still keep their 
suspicions about the US.24 Both Nye and Leonova agree that the suc-
cess of soft power depends not on the subject exerting soft power 
but on the object’s willingness to be attracted. In the words of David 
Marquand, Ghandi’s soft power was not the result of the actions of 
the Indians but rather the silent acceptance of those actions by the 
British.25 However, for Leonova, soft power is an element of decep-
tion and illusion for the most part, and for Nye, soft power is based 
on genuine attraction and co-optation.
Finally, it is necessary to overview the soft power resources and 
instruments indicated by Russian scholars. For Olga Leonova,26 soft 
power is the result of domestic sociocultural factors (ideology; style 
and quality of life and income; values, including national ideas; the 
mentality of a nation; national culture – art, literature, cinema, theat-
er, show business; the creative potential of a state – the ability to 
innovate) and external factors (foreign policy and authority in inter-
23 Nye J. S., The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs, 2011, p. xiii.
24 Wike R., “America’s Global Image,” Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewglobal.
org/2017/06/28/americas-global-image/>, 2018 06 23.
25 Marquand D., The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011, p. 155.
26 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики государства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 29.
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national relations; position in the global hierarchy and geopolitical 
status; civilizational status; the political and economic model of the 
state’s development; the development strategy of the state and the 
ability to implement it in practice; the informational resources of the 
state, its communicative mobility and positions on the Great Com-
munication Highway). For the most part, the domestic elements are 
quite similar to Nye’s proposed cultural and value elements of soft 
power. However, Leonova admittedly put a somewhat different spin 
on the external factors compared to Nye’s original writings.
As it was already mentioned, the positions of a state within a glob-
al hierarchy and its geopolitical status do not automatically translate 
into attractiveness, even though other countries may find it neces-
sary to maintain relations with a geopolitical giant. The civilizational 
aspect suggests that each great power is by definition a cradle of a 
particular civilization, and for this reason it must find itself in posses-
sion of some “natural” soft power resources within the countries that 
are part of this civilization. As Leonova puts it, “communication can 
only be comprehensible to the extent that it invokes the pre-existing 
cultural and historical tradition. Therefore, <…> the natural limit to 
the effect of soft power is the cultural-historical tradition of the object 
of influence.”27 Although framing the message according to a local 
cultural background is a textbook axiom of successful “marketing,” 
nowhere in the original Western conception does it say that the oper-
ation of soft power stops at the “borders” of civilization (if different 
“civilizations” even exist in the age of globalization). While it can be 
accepted that cultural and religious similarity could allow for greater 
soft power, the civilizational area does not set its limit (the global 
reach of Japan’s soft power is the best evidence of that).
Leonova also singles out the most important soft power instru-
ments for Russia (or any state for that matter): a flood of information, 
27 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики государства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 31.
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political public relations oriented to a foreign audience, global mar-
keting, the positioning of the state high up in the global hierarchy, the 
promotion of a national language around the world, public diploma-
cy; tourism, sports, and cultural exchange; a system of education and 
youth exchange programs; capabilities to wage information warfare; 
a migration policy; a national diaspora; a dialogue of cultures.28
The instruments listed above (at least some of them) also indicate 
Russia’s inclination to manage and control the course of events from 
within rather than engage with foreign audiences and discover mutu-
al interests. Especially idiosyncratic is the inclusion of information 
warfare, the essence of which is direct control over information flows 
(using cyber measures, if necessary) and a deliberate disorientation 
of the target audience. Even though Western “public diplomacy” and 
Russian information warfare have the same historical roots in the 
early 20th century propaganda, today’s conventional wisdom in the 
West is that a dialogue-like communication strategy and exchange 
are much more conducive to generating soft power than sheer prop-
aganda.29 The “instrumentalizing” of the national diaspora and mi-
grants as “agents” of state power (albeit soft) also bears a specific 
Russian undertone; it is an old and well-tested soft power strategy 
for diaspora groups to lobby the governments in their countries of 
residence for the good of their “motherland,” but for the “mother-
land” itself to use its citizens living abroad as decoys and a pretence 
to exert pressure on foreign countries falls under the category of hard 
rather than soft power. In other words, the Russian thinkers find the 
concept of soft power more comprehensible if they “adapt” it to the 
reality of Russian foreign policy.
28 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики государства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 30.
29 Melissen J., “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice” in Melis-
sen J. (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 16–19.
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2. Russia’s Efforts to Shape the Historical Discourse
The Baltic States continue to be perceived by Russia as the “near 
abroad,” or a former Soviet Union area where Russia has special in-
terests. Russian researchers like Leonova suggest that the expansion 
of Russia’s soft power should be targeted at countries that are objec-
tively interested in cooperation with Russia and are natural strategic 
partners, and such countries happen to be in the post-Soviet area and 
Central Asia.30 Of course, relations between Lithuania and Russia do 
not demonstrate any strategic partnership, while the strategic element 
in Russia’s relations with other countries of the ex-Soviet space can 
be quite easily argued against.  
A grave mistake is to assume that the ex-Soviet area is homoge-
nous in foreign policy approaches and Russia’s assessments, let alone 
historical narratives. The interests and perceptions of the Baltic States 
significantly differ compared to the interests of Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
or Armenia. While the former see Russia as the core economic force 
to benefit from, the later see it as the main security guarantor. The 
Baltic States have economically pragmatic interests toward Russia, 
but their strategic partnerships and genuine friendships lie firmly in 
the EU, NATO, and the US. 
Rejecting the aforementioned diversity, Leonova suggests that to 
expand soft power in the post-Soviet space, Russia should focus on31:
• “their [the countries’] common history and common destiny, 
which united them for centuries;
• the common traditions that developed in the era of their joint 
single multinational country – the ‘fifteen republics – fifteen 
sisters’;
30 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики госу дарства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 39–40.
31 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики государства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 39–40.
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• the common spiritual experience and experienced hardship 
and suffering during the Great Patriotic War.”
Because of the historical experience, especially The Second World 
War and an almost 50-year-long occupation, it would be more than 
odd for Lithuania to support the “common destiny” element. “The 
Constitutional Act of The Republic of Lithuania on the Non-Align-
ment of the Republic of Lithuania to Post-Soviet Eastern Unions,” 
adopted as early as June 8, 1992, determines that Lithuania will seek 
the development of mutually advantageous relations with each state 
that was formerly a component of the USSR but “will never join, in 
any form, any new political, military, economic, or other unions or 
commonwealths of states formed on the basis of the former USSR.”32 
Lithuania does not see its history as common – uniting – with Russia; 
in fact, Lithuania’s history is constructed for the most part on the 
fight with Russia and the resistance to its rule. 
Since the 15th century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and later 
the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth, competed against and fought 
a number of wars with the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and the subse-
quently emerged Russia. In 2005, the 4th of November was declared 
the Russian Day of Peoples’ Unity. This day is commemorating the 
date when Polish-Lithuanian forces were chased out from Moscow 
in 1612. This suggests that Russia focuses on the differences rather 
than common experiences with Lithuania and Poland when defining 
its national narrative. 
As for the three partitions of the Lithuanian-Polish Common-
wealth that took place in 1772, 1793, and 1795, they are assessed 
absolutely differently in the histories of the two countries. While par-
titions are seen in Russia as the expansion of its power, Lithuanians 
perceive them as a tragedy, as the country was annexed. The period 
of occupation of the Russian Empire in Lithuania is connected to 
the armed uprisings of 1831 and 1863 against the Russian govern-
ment, Russification, the ban on books published in the Lithuanian 
32 The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, <http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/
Constitution.htm>, 2018 08 25.
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language, serfdom, the closure of Vilnius University, the confiscation 
of lands and estates, and deportations to Siberia. 
The history of war with the Red Army for Lithuania’s independ-
ence after its reinstatement in 1918 also adds to the negative context 
of bilateral relations. The only period where some positive aspects in 
the relation of the two states – a pragmatic economic and political bi-
lateral cooperation – can be found is the interwar period, which lasted 
until 1939. However, the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in 
1939 indicated that it was impossible for Lithuania to trust Russia. 
The annexation of 1940, resembling the annexation of Crimea and 
the dismemberments of Moldova and Georgia, indicates a certain 
continuity in Russia’s foreign policy, suggesting that Russia is wait-
ing for opportunities to expand its power, influence, and territory at 
the expense of its neighbors. All in all, there are not many positive 
events in Lithuanian-Russian history on which the rapprochement 
discourse could be constructed. 
With regards to the “common spiritual experience and experi-
enced hardship and suffering during the Great Patriotic War,” Rus-
sia’s experience, as well as its assessment, was different from Lith-
uania’s. The Lithuanian experience does not resemble the myth on 
which Russian identity rests and which omits inconvenient facts. In 
Russian popular history, the beginning of World War II was the Nazi 
Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Concurrently, the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (i.e., the division of Europe and the stra-
tegic partnership between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and 
the attack on Poland in 1939 by the latter), the forced establishment 
of military bases in the Baltic States, the forged referendums, and the 
annexation of the Baltic States are also conveniently omitted from 
the myth of “Great Patriotic War.” After the occupation by the So-
viet Union, approximately 150 000 residents of Lithuania (includ-
ing children) were deported to Siberia.33 About 50 000 people were 
33 Anušauskas A. et al., Lietuva 1940–1990: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija [Lithuania 
1940–1990: The History of the Occupied Lithuania]. Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų 
genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimų centras, 2005, p. 289.
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executed or died from harsh living conditions in Soviet gulags. The 
experienced loss of residents is an equivalent of the population of 
the sixth largest city of Lithuania. The “liberation” by the Soviets 
did not mean freedom for Lithuania, which was truly regained only 
in 1990. In this context, Leonova’s “spiritual experience” element 
works against Russia’s interests. It creates cleavages between the two 
countries, because the period of WWII is connected to Soviet atroci-
ties, the loss of independence, the extermination of the country’s pop-
ulation, and the persecution of its culture and religion – not victory.
Finally, the 50-year-long forced membership in the Soviet Union 
(“the common traditions that developed in the era of their joint single 
multinational country – the ‘fifteen republics – fifteen sisters,’” accord-
ing to Leonova’s suggested soft power instruments) did not create any 
feelings of unity in the Baltic States, except for the identification of the 
Soviet period as a time of common suffering and cooperation between 
the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national independence move-
ments. The official ending of World War II in 1945 meant for Lithua-
nia only the prolongation of a war against the occupying forces of the 
Soviet Union. In the period from 1944 to 1953, more than 20 000 par-
ticipants of the resistance have been killed.34 The Policy of Sovietiza-
tion and Russification was implemented; the intelligentsia were either 
imprisoned, deported, or deprived of the opportunity to work; freedom 
of speech was suppressed; limitations on travel outside the Soviet Un-
ion were imposed. After the suppression of the armed resistance, non-
armed resistance efforts to Soviet rule lasted during the whole period of 
occupation, starting with the activities of the Roman Catholic Church, 
underground press materials, and even encompassing the youth’s focus 
on the elements of Western culture (jeans, rock music, etc.). 
Industrialization, the development of infrastructure, non-existent 
unemployment, low taxes, and some cultural elements (films and TV 
shows) are perceived in Lithuanian society as positive pictures re-
garding the Soviet period. However, the patterns of industrialization 
34 Anušauskas A. et al., Lietuva 1940–1990: okupuotos Lietuvos istorija [Lithuania 
1940–1990: The History of Occupied Lithuania]. Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų geno-
cido ir rezistencijos tyrimų centras, 2005, p. 357–8.
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and infrastructure development, as well as the development of the 
economy in the countries that have remained independent, suggest 
that it could have been achieved faster and more efficiently compared 
to the Soviet model. The comparison of Lithuanian and Finnish de-
velopment is usually provided as an example. The industrialization 
based on inefficient, energy-intensive, and wasteful manufacturing 
technologies led to high levels of pollution. Unemployment was bat-
tled with forced labor. In the cultural sphere, there was no diversity, at 
least officially. Unfortunately, the official cultural narrative achieved 
a significant level of indoctrination and attitude-building, which is 
still at work in the society that experienced it.  
To sum up, there are no genuinely positive images of the “fifteen 
republics – fifteen sisters” in Lithuanian perception. For the most 
part, the Soviet Union is associated with imprisonment. However, 
Russia does not seem to focus on the differences in perceptions of 
history. The differences in historical discourse lead to heightened ten-
sions between countries over Victory Day (the 9th of May in Russia) 
celebrations,35 occupation, and resistance. 
Through a unified and unilaterally defined historical discourse, 
Russia aims to deny opposing historical discourses. According 
to Sergey Rekeda, national historiography in the Baltic States has 
adopted the concept of a “triple occupation” (in 1940 by the Soviet 
Union, in 1941 by Nazi Germany, and in 1944 by the Red Army).36 
He continues by saying that “[t]he historical validity of this position 
in this case is irrelevant, as it is the political expediency of adhering 
to the ‘occupation doctrine’ framework that is of foremost impor-
tance.”37 This way Rekeda tries to vindicate Russian positions.
35 Janeliūnas T., „Gegužės 9-osios problema saugumizavimo teorijos ir komunikacinio 
saugumo požiūriu“ [The “9th of May issue” from the Perspectives of Securitization 
and Communicative Security], Politologija, No. 2 (38), 2005, p. 3–30.
36 Rekeda S., “Historical Mirror-World of Victory Day in the Baltic States,” RIAC, 
<http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/historical-mirror-
world-or-victory-day-in-the-baltic-states/?sphrase_id=11839892>, 2019 07 15.
37 Rekeda S., “Historical Mirror-World of Victory Day in the Baltic States,” RIAC, 
<http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/historical-mirror-
world-or-victory-day-in-the-baltic-states/?sphrase_id=11839892>, 2019 07 15.
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The historical discourse, as it has been presented by Leonova, 
is not a genuine soft power element. First and foremost, such a per-
ception serves the domestic audience because, according to Michael 
Kimmage, Russia is “unable to deal with its actual past, [so] the state 
has turned to celebratory myth.”38 The myth is of crucial significance 
for the government to keep support of the society and to assure itself 
of the might. Russia also strives to achieve both a hegemony of the 
narrative in the ex-Soviet space in the long term as well as to domi-
nate the narrative globally. 
The common history element, as well as Russia’s soft power in 
general, is directed to Russophone minorities and people bearing 
sentiments for the Soviet period in order to ensure their connections 
and unity with Russia and to hinder their engagement with general 
society. As Nerijus Maliukevičius noted, “Russian compatriots in the 
post-Soviet region shifted from being a Russian foreign policy tool 
to becoming a target for the new soft power strategy.”39 At the same 
time, the soft power approach is directly linked to sharp power. The 
Kremlin tries to accentuate cultural, linguistic, and ideological con-
nections in order to strengthen ties to Russia while simultaneously to 
also foster fear about the countries of their residence.40 The argument 
is supported with data gathered using surveys. 
A special survey focused on national minorities was conducted in 
2016, and it showed that Russia’s soft power influence on minorities 
38 Kimmage M., “The People’s Authoritarian: How Russian Society Created Putin,” For-
eign Affairs, Vol. 97 (No. 4), 2018.
39 Maliukevičius N., “(Re)Constructing Russian Soft Power in Post-Soviet Region”, 
Baltic Security & Defence Review, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2013, p. 74.
40 Kasčiūnas L., Vaišnys A., Garbačiauskaitė-Budrienė M., Keršanskas V., Kojala L., Le-
gatas Š., „Rusijos propaganda Lietuvoje: situacijos ir proceso analizė“ [Russia’s Propa-
ganda in Lithuania: Situation and Process Analysis], Vaišnys A. et al., Rusijos propagan-
da: analizė, įvertinimas, rekomendacijos [Russian Propaganda: Analysis, Assessment, 
Recommendations], Vilnius, Rytų Europos studijų centras, 2017, 77;  Denisenko V., 
„Kremliaus propagandinių matricų, taikomų Baltijos šalims ir Ukrainai, panašumai ir 
skirtumai“ [The Similarities and Differences of the Kremlin Propaganda Matrices Ap-
plied in the Baltic States and Ukraine], Žurnalistikos tyrimai [Journalism Research], 
Issue 11, 2016, p. 109–10.
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is high, and that the historical and political discourse applied in Rus-
sia is also accepted by minorities in Lithuania. The survey showed 
that 37% of the Russian minority respondents agreed with the state-
ment that people lived better in the Soviet period than now; among 
the Polish minority respondents, the same answer was chosen by as 
many as 41%.41 This, to some extent, puts into question the assump-
tions made by Kristian Nielsen and Heiko Paabo that “the Europe-
an integration seems to ensure that even the Russophone minorities 
look unlikely to ever reorient back to Russia.”42 The EU did provide 
Russophone citizens with opportunities to travel and work in any EU 
country, and these higher living standards limit Russia’s soft power 
influence over minorities. However, economic rationality and nation-
al feelings or feelings of connection do not necessary cancel each 
other out. Minorities may enjoy opportunities provided by the EU, 
but this does not mean that they do not support Russia’s actions – and 
this is what the survey of minorities in Lithuania actually showed. 
The survey indicated that Russian and Polish minorities strongly sup-
port Russian President Vladimir Putin; 73% of Russians answered 
that they like Putin or that they like him a lot, and among the Polish 
minority, such answers amounted to 64%.43
Even though Leonova suggests that “it is desirable to emphasize 
Russia’s respect for the status of [former soviet republics] as sover-
eign states, respect for their culture and understanding specific fea-
41 Saldžiūnas V., „Spec. tyrimas: ką darytų Lietuvos rusai ir lenkai, jei Kremlius pultų 
Baltijos šalis?“ [Special Investigation: What Would Lithuanian Russians and Poles Do 
if the Kremlin Attacked the Baltic States?], Delfi, <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/
medijos-karas-propaganda/spec-tyrimas-ka-darytu-lietuvos-rusai-ir-lenkai-jei-krem-
lius-pultu-baltijos-salis.d?id=71971382>, 2018 06 20.
42 Nielsen K., Paabo H., “How Russian Soft Power Fails in Estonia: Or Why the Russo-
phone Minorities Remain Quiescent,” Journal of Baltic Security, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2015, 
p. 125–157. 
43 Saldžiūnas V., „Spec. tyrimas: ką darytų Lietuvos rusai ir lenkai, jei Kremlius pultų 
Baltijos šalis?“ [Special Investigation: What Would Lithuanian Russians and Poles Do 
if the Kremlin Attacked the Baltic States?], Delfi, <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/
medijos-karas-propaganda/spec-tyrimas-ka-darytu-lietuvos-rusai-ir-lenkai-jei-krem-
lius-pultu-baltijos-salis.d?id=71971382>, 2018 06 20.
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tures of the chosen development models,”44 the Russian government 
does not seem to take into account Leonova’s recommendations. 
In 2015, the Russian chief prosecutor’s office planned to examine 
whether the Soviet Union acted legally when it recognized the in-
dependence of the Baltic States in 1991.45 In 2012, The Komsomol-
skaya Pravda published an article claiming that during the events of 
January 13, 1991, Lithuanians have been shooting at other Lithuani-
ans, and Soviet troops did no harm and have been falsely accused.46 
In July 2018, the Investigative Committee of Russia initiated a crim-
inal prosecution of Lithuanian judges and prosecutors investigating 
cases against Russian servicemen involved in the events of the Jan-
uary 13, 1991.47 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, 
in his famous article reviewing the impact of Russia on the history of 
international affairs, claims that “[i]f you take an unbiased look at the 
smaller European countries, which previously were part of the War-
saw Treaty, and are now members of the EU or NATO, it is clear that 
the issue was not about going from subjugation to freedom, which 
Western masterminds like to talk about, but rather a change of lead-
ership.”48 In the article, he basically denies the forceful integration of 
the Baltic States into the Soviet Union as well as the oppression that 
the Central and Eastern European countries have endured. Further-
44 Леонова О., “Мягкая сила – ресурс внешней политики государства” [Soft Pow-
er – A Resource of the Foreign Policy of a State], Научно-аналитический журнал 
«Обозреватель – Observer», No. 4, 2013, p. 40.
45 BBC, “Russia Examines 1991 Recognition of Baltic Independence,” <http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-33325842>, 2018 08 14.
46 Сапожникова Г., “Неужели в 1991-м в Вильнюсе «свои стреляли в своих»? 
Часть 1-я” [Could It Be that “They Shot Their Own” in 1991 in Vilnius? Part 1], 
Комсомольская правда [Komsomolskaya Pravda], <https://www.kompravda.eu/
daily/25816.4/2794758/>, 2018 06 20.
47 Interfax, “СКР возбудил уголовное дело против литовских судей и прокуроров” 
[The ICR Initiated a Criminal Case against Lithuanian Judges and Prosecutors], 
<http://www.interfax.ru/russia/622083?utm_source=top>, 2018 06 30. 
48 Lavrov S., “Russia’s Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective,” Russia in Global 
Affairs, March 30, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Foreign-Policy-in-a-
Historical-Perspective-18067>, 2018 07 30.
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more, those countries are not even considered fully sovereign states 
capable of having their independent foreign policies.
For the aforementioned reasons and contexts, it is not a surprise 
that mistrust is the outcome of the historical experience of Lithuani-
an-Russian relations, which prevents Lithuania from seeking closer 
cooperation with Russia. Russia lacks credibility in Lithuania, and, in 
the words of J. Nye, “soft power depends upon credibility and when 
governments are perceived as manipulative and information is seen 
as propaganda, credibility is destroyed.”49 The actions taken by the 
Russian government toward Lithuania are essentially perceived by 
the latter as a historical continuation of malevolent policies applied 
toward it in the past. In order to use history as a soft power instrument 
in Lithuania, Russia has to respect the different viewpoints toward 
the same events and recognize its actual role in the sufferings and 
successes of other countries. However, it cannot do this because of 
political interests and the need to preserve the national myth for Rus-
sians and Russophone minorities, which is of higher importance than 
soft power in ex-Soviet countries. 
3. The Demographic and Cultural Trends  
of the Lithuanian Society and Their Implications  
for Russia’s Soft Power
Russia’s soft power faces a demographic challenge in Lithuania due 
to the natural generational change, as the number of people who 
might have sentiments for the Soviet period is decreasing. The de-
mographic change puts an increasing limitation on Russia’s soft 
power expansion in the cultural field due to the unfavorable trends of 
knowledge of the Russian language. 
According to Ainė Ramonaitė, the nostalgia for the Soviet period 
in the society, which is directly linked to the social status in the Soviet 
49 Nye J. S., The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs, 2011, p. 83.
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period and its change since the establishment of independence, is the 
strongest variable allowing to explain the favorable positions of the so-
ciety toward Russia.50 At the same time, it makes society more vulner-
able to Russia’s sharp power. However, generational changes lead to 
the decreasing positive evaluation of the Soviet period, as the number 
of people who lived during the Soviet period constantly decreases and 
the living standards in Lithuania compared to other ex-Soviet republics 
(except for Estonia and Latvia) significantly improves. In 2004, there 
were 44.4% of respondents questioned during a national survey who 
agreed with the statement that life during the Soviet period was better 
than in independent Lithuania, and by 2016, this number decreased 
to 25.8%.51 This trend allows to assume that the Lithuanian society is 
becoming more resistant to Russia’s soft power.
The demographic changes in Lithuania are leading to a decreas-
ing knowledge of the Russian language, which is considered to be 
one of the most important soft power elements of Russia. According 
to Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept (2013), one of its main foreign 
policy tasks is “[to] promote and consolidate the position of the Rus-
sian language in the world.”52 The data of 2001 and 2011 do show 
the critical decrease in knowledge of the Russian language among the 
younger generation. According to the data of 2011, more than 80% 
of the age group of 15–19-year-old Lithuanian residents could speak 
English, in comparison to only about 40% who were able to converse 
in Russian.53 It is safe to assume that the number of residents who 
50 Ramonaitė A. et al., Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos? Pilietinio pasipriešinimo prielaidos ir 
galimybės [Who Would Go to Defend Lithuania? The Presumptions and Capabilities 
of Civil Resistance], Vilnius, 2018, p. 155.
51 Jastramskis M., „Auditorijos reakcija: Rusijos propagandos poveikis Lietuvoje“ [The 
Reaction of the Audience: The Impact of Russian Propaganda in Lithuania], Vaiš-
nys A. et al., Rusijos propaganda: analizė, įvertinimas, rekomendacijos [Russian Pro-
paganda: Analysis, Assessment, Recommendations], Vilnius, Rytų Europos studijų 
centras, 2017, p. 138.
52 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by President of the 
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016.
53 Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, „Gyventojai pagal išsilavinimą ir kalbų mokėjimą. 
Lietuvos Respublikos 2011 metų visuotinio gyventojų ir būstų surašymo rezultatai“ 
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were born during the Soviet period and were forced to learn Russian 
will decrease and that the English language will substitute Russian as 
the main second language of the country’s residents. The result will 
be natural decrease of consumption of Russian culture – films, music, 
books, TV production and Russian internet sources – thus inevitably 
limiting the reach of Russian soft power. In fact, Russia is already 
adapting to this situation. 
In order to expand Russia’s soft power and informational space 
globally, including the ex-Soviet states, the Russian state invests a lot 
in English language news sources like RT and Sputnik (which also 
has a news portal in Lithuanian). The gradual transition toward Eng-
lish language media helps Russia to spread its message to a broader 
audience as well as to decrease any suspicion about the information 
that is initially connected to the usage of the Russian language. 
Survey data suggest that the average audience of Russian TV chan-
nels in Lithuania is decreasing. According to data gathered on TV audi-
ences, the average daily reach of the most watched Russian channels in 
Lithuania in December 2011 (when there are a lot of shows on Russian 
TV that play on the cord of Soviet nostalgia for the middle-aged and 
senior population, who are the main TV viewers) were PBK (12.5%), 
REN TV Baltija (8.8%), RTR Planeta (10.2%), and NTV Mir (8.2%).54 
The data for December 2017 show that the most popular Russian TV 
channels according to daily reach were PBK (9.4%), NTV Mir Lietuva 
(6.6%), and REN Lietuva (4.7%).55 This would suggest a decreased 
interest in Russian TV channels, but it has to be noted that the broad-
[Residents according to Education and Language Skills. Results of the 2011 Popula-
tion and Housing Census of the Republic of Lithuania], <https://osp.stat.gov.lt/docu-
ments/10180/217110/Gyv+pagal+i%C5%A1silavinima_ir_kalbu_mokejima.pdf/
b75c5e7a-e733-48fa-95e4-83d485c6726a>, 2018 07 05.
54 TNS, „TV auditorijos tyrimo rezultatai 2011 m. Gruodis“ [TV Audience Survey Re-
sults for 2011 December], <http://www.tns.lt/lt/news/tv-auditorijos-tyrimo-rezultatai-
2011-m-gruodis/>, 2018 08 16.
55 TNS, „TV auditorijos tyrimo rezultatai 2017 m. Gruodis“ [TV Audience Survey Re-
sults for 2017 December], <http://www.tns.lt/lt/news/tv-auditorijos-tyrimo-rezultatai-
2017-m-gruodis/>, 2018 08 16. 
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casting of RTR Planeta and later of REN TV Baltic in Lithuania was 
suspended by the decision of the Radio and Television Commission of 
Lithuania, as these channels broadcasted shows that distorted histori-
cal facts and spread propaganda.56 These activities became extremely 
intensive after Russia’s invasion of Crimea. Unfortunately, the real au-
dience of Russian TV channels cannot be determined, as viewers can 
watch Russian TV channels using satellite dishes and decoders, also 
receiving free digital television signals from the Kaliningrad area and 
Belarus in the Southern and Southeastern regions of Lithuania, so the 
audience of the Russian TV channels can be expected to be higher, and 
the impact of Russian soft power is greater than it can be measured by 
TV audience data.
On the other hand, it can be observed that number of hours of TV 
production in Russian language is constantly increasing in Lithuani-
an TV channels. Shows produced in the Russian language consisted 
of 151 weekly hours in 2016, and it was already 212 hours a week 
in 2019, marking an increase of 40%.57 However, this production is 
subtitled and broadcasted on TV channels with a rather small audi-
ence. One of the Lithuanian TV channels, Lietuvos rytas TV, broad-
casting nearly half of its production in the Russian language (more 
than 4 days out of 7 a week), had an average audience share of 4.7% 
(data of December 2018).58 This shows that TV production in the 
56 LRT, „Stabdomos rusiško „RTR Planeta“ transliacijos, gali uždrausti ir kitus kana-
lus“ [Russian TV Channel RTR Planeta Broadcasting is Halted, Other Channels May 
Also Be Banned], <https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/98295/stabdomos-rusisko-
rtr-planeta-transliacijos-gali-uzdrausti-ir-kitus-kanalus>, 2018 06 17; LRT, „Stabdo-
mos „Ren TV Baltic“ programų transliacijos“ [The Broadcasting of Ren TV Baltic 
Is Halted], <https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/89922/stabdomos-ren-tv-baltic-
programu-transliacijos>, 2018 08 17.
57 Lėka A., „Lietuviškuose TV kanaluose lietuvybės mąžta“ [The Usage of the Lithuanian 
Language in Lithuanian TV Channels is Decreasing], <https://www.lzinios.lt/Lietuva/
lietuviskuose-tv-kanaluose-lietuvybes-mazta/280470?fbclid=IwAR2plTDtcu5-
8Cm3Who_Sez7x4IYfW9WeBgIWqZjE3XFN2J9XDh85aW_P0M>, 2019 02 07. 
58 TNS, „TV auditorijos tyrimo rezultatai 2018 m. gruodis“ [TV Audience Survey Re-
sults for 2018], <http://www.tns.lt/lt/news/tv-auditorijos-tyrimo-rezultatai-2018-m-
gruodis/>, 2019 02 07.
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Russian language is more accessible when it is translated or subtitled 
in Lithuanian, but that audiences are not craving for it.
It has to be noted that the Lithuanian government tries to the di-
versify informational channels available to minorities. In May 2018, 
the broadcasting of five Polish TV channels was introduced. Lithu-
anian TV service suppliers also broadcast a news channel Current 
Time, which is in Russian, as a countermeasure to news produced 
in Russia. This should contribute to the decreasing consumption of 
Russian information in Lithuania.
The Soviet nostalgia remains the core cultural element in reach-
ing the minorities, as well as the general population, in Lithuania for 
Russia’s soft power. The most popular Russian film screened in Lith-
uanian cinemas was The Irony of Fate. Sequel (2007) and is ranking 
number 32 in the list of most popular films in Lithuania, as it was 
seen by 118 669 viewers.59 The film is based on the classic Soviet 
film The Irony of Fate, which is still screened on TV channels in most 
of the Russian and ex-Soviet countries during the New Year. The sec-
ond most viewed Russian film is The Barber of Siberia (1999), rank-
ing 62 with 93 334 viewers – an extremely romanticized look on the 
late 19th century Russia. The third most watched film, The Very Best 
Film (2008), ranks 295 with 38 318 viewers, indicating a decreasing 
appeal for contemporary Russian cinema and culture, while cinemas 
in Lithuania are dominated by Hollywood production, which viewers 
find more relatable.
The impact of Russia’s soft power in Lithuania decreases because 
the community of Russians in Lithuania is getting smaller as well. 
According to the data of the Department of Statistics of Lithuania, 
the number of Russians living in Lithuania significantly decreased. 
In 2001, they made up 6.8% of all residents of the country, and by 
59 Lietuvos kino centras, „Kino statistika, Lietuvos kino teatruose rodytų filmų top 
(1993–2017)“ [Cinema Statistics, the Top Films Screened in Lithuanian Cinemas 
(1993–2017)], <http://www.lkc.lt/paslaugos/statistiniu-duomenu-ataskaitos/>, 2018 
08 17.
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2017, the number had contracted to 4.6%.60 The decreasing number 
of Russian minority residents in Lithuania is related to increasing 
emigration. Data suggest that emigration from Lithuania was high-
er among Russians than Lithuanians, but the destinations of these 
migrants were usually places other than Russia, which also tells of 
the low socioeconomic attractiveness of Russia for the Russian mi-
nority. The average emigration of Lithuanian residents to Russia in 
2010–2017 was only about 3.06% of the total emigration. During the 
period of 2010–2017, the highest rate emigration of Lithuanian resi-
dents to Russia was in 2015, when there were 2801 emigrants, while 
the lowest rate occurred in 2012 with 932 emigrants. The overall 
emigration of Lithuanian residents to Russia averaged 1443 during 
the period of 2010–2017. The emigration of Lithuanian citizens to 
Russia was even lower and averaged 539 emigrants during the period 
of 2010–2017.61 This would suggest that the soft power of the EU 
member states or countries within the European Economic Area is 
higher over Lithuanian citizens and residents (including the Russian 
minority) than Russia’s soft power.
Another important element of Russia’s soft power, especially on 
the Russian minority, is the Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). 
In Russia, the Church and the government are closely interconnected. 
The government preserves churches outside Russia and strongly sup-
ports the Orthodox Church outside Russia in order to create stronger 
links with communities abroad. According to Maliukevičius, it is a 
power instrument of Russia, allowing to shape the positions of the 
religious community on policy issues.62 The Orthodox Church (Mos-
60 Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, „2001 m. Surašymas: Romos katalikų daugiau-
sia“ [Census 2001: The Majority Are Roman Catholic], <https://osp.stat.gov.lt/docu-
ments/10180/212826/2002_11_07.pdf/bf2681a0-21d6-416d-b07e-32d5939ccda1>, 
2018 07 05;  See also: Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, “The Lithuanian 2011 
Population Census in Brief,” <https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/217110/Lietu-
vos_gyventojai_2011.pdf/8321a3c1-c8b9-4468-825c-52a7b753f281>, 2018 07 05.
61 Information provided by the Statistics Department of Lithuania.
62 Maliukevičius N., “(Re)Constructing Russian Soft Power in Post-Soviet Region,” 
Baltic Security & Defence Review, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2013, p. 88.
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cow Patriarchate) facilitates strong links between its members and 
Russia. In 2011, there were 125.2 thousand members of the Ortho-
dox Church and 23.3 thousand Old believers.63 A little more than 
51% of all Russians in Lithuania identify themselves as members of 
the Orthodox Church. The number of Orthodox churches and clergy 
increased despite that the official congregation decreased by nearly 
20 000, from 141.8 thousand members in 2001.64 The autocephaly of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, in effect since October 2018, has so 
far not manifested within the Orthodox Church in Lithuania signifi-
cantly, as the community of ethnic Ukrainians in Lithuania is much 
smaller than the community of ethnic Russians.
To sum up, the demographic tendencies in Lithuania will continue 
to limit Russia’s soft power in the long term if they will not change 
significantly – i.e., if there will be no influx of Russophone immi-
grants who associate themselves with Russia. The decreasing knowl-
edge of the language will affect the consumption of culture. Russia 
will have to seek other approaches to increase its soft power, main-
ly by applying English or Lithuanian languages. These changes are 
already being implemented in the informational space. At the same 
time, the change of the generations might allow Russia to reconstruct 
its discourse of the Soviet period, because the number of Lithuanian 
citizens who lived during the Soviet period, and especially the ones 
who participated in the resistance, is decreasing. Therefore, the So-
viet period can become romanticized – by perpetuating the historical 
examples or myths regarding, for example, the small taxes, the full 
employment of the population, and order and equality.
63 Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, “The Lithuanian 2011 Population Census in 
Brief,” <https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/217110/Lietuvos_gyventojai_2011.
pdf/8321a3c1-c8b9-4468-825c-52a7b753f281>, 2018 07 05.
64 Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, „2001 m. Surašymas: Romos katalikų daugiau-
sia“ [Census 2001: The Majority Are Roman Catholic], <https://osp.stat.gov.lt/docu-
ments/10180/212826/2002_11_07.pdf/bf2681a0-21d6-416d-b07e-32d5939ccda1>, 
2018 07 05.
ISSN 1392-1681   eISSN 2424-6034   Politologija 2019/1 (93)
88
4. Opportunities for Russia’s Soft Power in Lithuania
Despite the negative historical experience and the increasing limita-
tions for Russia’s soft power expansion, Russia has opportunities to 
increase the impact of its soft power in Lithuania. This argument is 
based on public polling data showing that Lithuanian residents want 
better relations with Russia.
The surveys conducted in January 2018 suggest that a fair share 
of Lithuanians see the need to have more intensive political relations 
with Russia. The first survey (conducted at the beginning of Janu-
ary) asked whether Lithuania needs to renew political relations with 
Russia, and 52% of the respondents supported the statement that it 
does.65 Later, another survey inquired the following: “should Lith-
uania develop closer relations with Russia, even if it would harm 
Lithuania’s security?” The statement that it should was supported by 
34.4% of the respondents.66 The third survey, ordered by the Ministry 
of Defence in December 2018, also asked its respondents if it would 
be useful for Lithuania to improve relations with Russia: 49% of the 
respondents supported the idea, while 35% had an opinion that Lith-
uania’s policy toward Russia is too harsh.67 In the survey conducted 
in 2010, 47.8% of the respondents supported the idea that the Lith-
uanian president should attend the commemoration of Victory Day 
65 Saldžiūnas V., „Dėl santykių su Rusija lietuvių paklausė dar kartą: rezultatus keičia 
vie na sąlyga“ [Lithuanians Have Been Asked Once Again about Relations with Rus-
sia: One Condition Changes the Results], <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/medijos-
karas-propaganda/del-santykiu-su-rusija-lietuviu-paklause-dar-karta-rezultatus-kei-
cia-viena-salyga.d?id=77114831>, 2018 06 20.
66 Saldžiūnas V., „Dėl santykių su Rusija lietuvių paklausė dar kartą: rezultatus keičia 
viena sąlyga“ Lithuanians Have Been Asked Once Again about Relations with Russia: 
One Condition Changes the Results ], <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/medijos-karas-
propaganda/del-santykiu-su-rusija-lietuviu-paklause-dar-karta-rezultatus-keicia-vie-
na-salyga.d?id=77114831>, 2018 06 20.
67 Saldžiūnas V., „Prieštaringa apklausa: įvardija didžiausią šalies priešą, nori jį bausti 
ir draugauti“ [A Controversial Poll: Naming the Biggest Enemy of the State, Wanting 
to Punish Them and Befriend Them], Delfi, <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/medi-
jos-karas-propaganda/priestaringa-apklausa-ivardija-didziausia-salies-priesa-nori-ji-
bausti-ir-draugauti.d?id=80055727>, 2019 01 23.
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in Moscow.68 This shows that there is some strong support for better 
relations with Russia in the Lithuanian society despite Russia’s ag-
gressive actions in the neighborhing area and its increasing militari-
zation. The data suggests that Russia’s soft power would be accepted 
by the society. It can also be assumed that the society expects that 
aggressiveness can be diminished through better relations. 
Despite the wish to have better relations, surveys show that re-
spondents are quite realistic about Russia. In a survey conducted in 
2010, when Lithuania tried to improve relations with Russia quite 
intensively, only 2.2% of respondents agreed with the statement that 
Russian authorities are looking at Lithuania “in friendly way, as if at 
a strategic partner.”69 This would suggest that even Russophone mi-
norities and other minorities are quite sceptical about Russia’s friend-
liness toward Lithuania. In the same survey, 21.5% of the respondents 
thought that the Russian government sees Lithuania “rather negative-
ly and tries to harm it occasionally,” and 17% of the respondents 
assumed that the Russian government sees Lithuania “negatively and 
sees it as the lost part of an empire that it would happily recover.”70 
A survey conducted at the end of 2018 indicated that 15% of the re-
spondents assumed that Russia is friendly nation.71 
68 Dirgytė E., „Pusė gyventojų būtų laiminę D. Grybauskaitės kelionę į Maskvą“, [Half 
of the Lithuanian Citizens Would Have Approved for Dalia Grybauskaite’s Trip to 
Moscow], Delfi, <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/puse-gyventoju-butu-lai-
mine-dgrybauskaites-kelione-i-maskva.d?id=29079143>, 2018 08 16. 
69 Dirgytė E., „Pusė gyventojų būtų laiminę D. Grybauskaitės kelionę į Maskvą“, [Half 
of the Lithuanian Citizens Would Have Approved for Dalia Grybauskaite’s Trip to 
Moscow ], Delfi, <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/puse-gyventoju-butu-lai-
mine-dgrybauskaites-kelione-i-maskva.d?id=29079143>, 2018 08 16.
70 Dirgytė E., „Pusė gyventojų būtų laiminę D. Grybauskaitės kelionę į Maskvą“, [Half 
of the Lithuanian Citizens Would Have Approved for Dalia Grybauskaite’s Trip to 
Moscow ], Delfi, <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/puse-gyventoju-butu-lai-
mine-dgrybauskaites-kelione-i-maskva.d?id=29079143>, 2018 08 16.
71 Saldžiūnas V., „Prieštaringa apklausa: įvardija didžiausią šalies priešą, nori jį bausti 
ir draugauti“ [A Controversial Poll: Naming the Biggest Enemy of the State, Wanting 
to Punish Them and Befriend Them], Delfi, <https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/medi-
jos-karas-propaganda/priestaringa-apklausa-ivardija-didziausia-salies-priesa-nori-ji-
bausti-ir-draugauti.d?id=80055727>, 2019 01 23.
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The core element undercutting any positive assessment of Russia 
is its aggressive actions in the neighboring area. Surveys show that 
respondents and the society overall are afraid of Russia. The survey of 
2017 indicates that 43% of the respondents agreed with the statement 
that Russia’s policies pose a direct threat to the Baltic States.72 The 
assumptions of any threat decreased comparing to the results of a sur-
vey conducted in 2014, which showed that 55.5% of the respondents 
agreed with the statement that there is a threat from Russia, and that 
27.7% believed that Russia might use military force against Lithuania; 
economic, energy, and information threats were recognized as even 
more plausible.73 Even prior to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the sur-
vey conducted by Spinter in 2011 indicated that 78% of the respond-
ents felt threatened by Russia’s energy policy, and that 79% expressed 
support for measures to decrease the energy dependency on Russia.74
The threat posed by Russia does not lead to bandwagoning on 
the part of Lithuania, i.e., there occurs no alignment with the most 
probable threat; rather, the threat is balanced by integrating closer 
within the EU and NATO. The history of those states that had aligned 
with Russia in the ex-Soviet region in order to mediate threats from 
it and to create strong relationships shows that they were punished 
or had to make significant concessions. The perception of a threat 
diminishes Russia’s soft power possibilities. However, as long as the 
target groups of its soft power are Russophone minorities and people 
with strong sentiments for the Soviet period, aggressiveness does not 
seem to harm it.
72 Ramonaitė A. et al., Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos? Pilietinio pasipriešinimo prielaidos ir 
galimybės [Who Would Go to Defend Lithuania? The Presumptions and Capabilities 
of Civil Resistance], Vilnius, 2018, p. 140.
73 Samoškaitė E., „Ką mums gali padaryti Rusija“ [What Can Russia Do to Us], Delfi, 
<https://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/ka-mums-gali-padaryti-rusija.d?id=66202994> 
2018 07 20.
74 Spinter, 2011, „Keturi iš penkių Lietuvos gyventojų nuogąstauja dėl Rusijos energeti-
nio spaudimo“ [Four out of Five Lithuanian Residents are Concerned about Russia’s 
Pressure in the Energy Sector], <http://www.spinter.lt/site/lt/vidinis_noslide/menu-
top/9/home/publish/MzM0Ozk7MDsw>, 2018 07 20.
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Conclusions
Soft power has become a crucial currency in the global politics of 
the 21st century, as with the end of the Cold War’s bipolarity, the 
number of competing ideas, historical narratives, and values grows 
exponentially. Russia is taking part in this global competition, es-
pecially focusing its soft power strategy on the former territory of 
the Soviet Union. Lithuania has been the target of this strategy for 
the past two decades but with limited success, as its foreign policy 
orientation seems to lean ever more westward. The geographical and 
historical closeness between the two countries does not seem to count 
for much, as soft power does not come “naturally”; in order to accu-
mulate it, one needs a sustained communicative strategy and years of 
consistent actions, and yet it can be lost overnight, as the last decade 
of the Lithuania-Russia relations has illustrated in particular.
The deep-seated roots of Russia’s soft power failures in Lithuania 
can be traced to the very conception of what soft power is and how it 
can be exerted. Contrary to the Western understanding, Russia views 
soft power much like a “one-way traffic” that conceptually has been 
always associated with hard power; rather than trying to understand 
the experiences and values of others in order to build its strategy on 
the positive bits shared by both sides, Russia tries to forcefully im-
pose its own discourse onto others; such a strategy can only work if 
the overlap between the experiences and beliefs is large enough, but 
as the case of Lithuania shows, it can also fail severely. The focus 
on “the fifteen sister republics” or the “shared victory in the Great 
Patriotic War” are typical examples of Russia’s misplaced soft power 
strategy, as those are exactly the points of historical narratives of the 
two countries that are the furthest apart. The Lithuanian audience can 
hardly succumb to the Russian version of history as it contradicts the 
foundations of Lithuania’s national identity, and yet Russia sticks to 
an outright denial of the Lithuanian version.
The demographic characteristics of the Lithuanian society could 
be summarized as being relatively well-disposed toward the impact 
ISSN 1392-1681   eISSN 2424-6034   Politologija 2019/1 (93)
92
of Russia’s soft power, especially because of the significant Russo-
phone minority and rudimentary knowledge of the Russian language 
within the Lithuanian society. The general public seems to be am-
biguous at best about their feelings toward Russia: on the one hand, 
they expresses deep suspicions or even fear toward Russia; at the 
same time, Lithuanians want the official relations between Vilnius 
and Moscow to improve despite the odds. So all in all, there is still 
enough “social fabric” for Russia to work with, especially as its so-
called “soft power instruments” primarily target Russian speakers. 
Yet as those demographic characteristics are diminishing due to emi-
gration and the generational turnover, Russia seems to be losing any 
opportunity to increase its attractiveness in Lithuania.
However, the greatest setback to Russia’s soft power in Lithuania 
is arguably caused by its continuing (or even increasing) reliance on 
hard power; when it comes to post-Soviet space, Russia still prioritiz-
es hard rather than soft power through the use of economic, financial, 
and military measures that materialize as threats, rewards, and pun-
ishments. From the theoretical standpoint, a growth in hard power 
and its practical application does not cancel out the growth of soft 
power if the former is put to a “moral” and “unselfish” use; on the 
contrary, coercive actions (such as economic sanctions and military 
interventions), which are seen as necessary and legitimate by others, 
can even increase a country’s soft power potential. However, Russia 
has proven to be incapable of performing the role of the impartial 
“policeman” within the post-Soviet space and has always given (or 
at least was seen as giving) priority to its own national interests over 
international obligations.
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